Can the game be quantum? by Grib, Andrey & Parfionov, Georges
ar
X
iv
:q
ua
nt
-p
h/
02
06
17
8v
1 
 2
5 
Ju
n 
20
02
CAN THE GAME
BE QUANTUM?
Andrey Grib∗, Georges Parfionov†
Alexandre Friedmann Laboratory of Theoretical Physics
St.Petersburg University of Economics and Finances
St.Petersburg, Russia 191023
Fax: +7(812)110-5742, Telephone: +7(812)110-5605
Abstract
The game in which acts of participants don’t have an adequate description in
terms of Boolean logic and classical theory of probabilities is considered. The
model of the game interaction is constructed on the basis of a non-distributive
orthocomplemented lattice. Mixed strategies of the participants are calculated
by the use of probability amplitudes according to the rules of quantum me-
chanics. A scheme of quantization of the payoff function is proposed and an
algorithm for the search of Nash equilibrium is given. It is shown that differently
from the classical case in the quantum situation a discrete set of equilibrium is
possible.
Introduction
It often occurs that mathematical structures discovered when solving some class of
problems find their natural application in totally different areas. The mathemati-
cal formalism of quantum mechanics operating with such notions as ”observable”,
”state”, ”probability amplitude” is not an exception to this rule. The goal of the
present paper is to show that the language of quantum mechanics, initially applied
to the description of the microworld, is adequate for the description of some macro-
scopic systems and situations where Planck’s constant plays no role. It is natural to
∗e-mail: grib@friedman.usr.lgu.spb.su
†e-mail: your@GP5574.spb.edu
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look for applications of the formalism of quantum mechanics in those situations when
one has interactions with the element of indeterminacy. So in recent papers [5, 6, 7]
the connection of quantum mechanics with decision problems in the conditions of
the indeterminacy is discussed. In [3] as well as more recently [4] it was shown that
the quantum mechanical formalism can be applied to description of macroscopical
systems when the distributive property for random events is broken. In the physics
of the microworld non-distributivity has an objective status and must be present in
principle. For macroscopic systems the non-distributivity of random events expresses
some specific case of the observer’s ”ignorance”.
In the present paper a quantum mechanical formalism is applied to the analysis of
a conflict interaction, the mathematical model for which is an antagonistic game of two
persons. The game is based on a generalisation of examples of the macroscopical au-
tomata simulating the behaviour of some quantum systems considered earlier in [1, 2].
A special feature of the game considered is that the players acts go in contradiction
with the usual logic. The consequence is breaking of the classical probability interpre-
tation of the mixed strategy: the sum of the probabilities for alternate outcomes may
be larger than one. The cause of breaking of the basic property of the probability is
in the non-distributivity of the logic. The partners relations are such that the disjunc-
tion ”or”, conjunction ”and” and the operation of negation do not form a Boolean
algebra but an orthocomplemented non-distributive lattice. However this ortholattice
happens to be just that which describes some properties of a quantum system with
spin one half. This leads to new ”quantum” rules for the calculations of the average
profit and new representation of the mixed strategy, the role of which is played by
the ”wave function” – the normalised vector in a finite dimensional Hilbert space.
Calculations of probabilities are made according to the standard rules of quantum
mechanics. Differently from the examples of quantum games considered in [8, 9, 10]
where the ”quantum” nature of the game was conditioned by the microparticles or
quantum computers based on them, in our case we deal with a macroscopic game,
the quantum nature of which has nothing to do with microparticles. This gives the
hope that our example is one of many analogous situations in biology, economics etc
where the formalism of quantum mechanics can be used.
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1 . Where were you Bob?
The game ”Wise Alice” formulated in our paper is a modification of the well known
game when each of the participants names one of some previously considered objects.
In the case if the results differ, one of the players wins from the other some agreed
sum of money. The participants of our game A and B, call them Alice and Bob have
a quadratic box in which a ball is located. Bob puts his ball in one of the corners of
the box but doesn’t tell his partner which corner. Alice must guess in which corner
Bob has put his ball. The rules of the game are such that Alice can ask Bob questions
supposing the two-valued answer: ”yes” or ”no”. It is supposed that Bob is honest
and always tells the truth. In the case of a ”yes” answer Alice is satisfied, in the
opposite case she asks Bob to pay her some compensation. However, differently from
other such games [11] the rules of this game (see Fig. 1) have one specific feature: Bob
has the possibility to move the ball to any of the adjacent vertices of the square after
Alice asks her question. This additional condition decisively changes the behaviour
of Bob, making him to become active under the influence of Alice’s questions. Due
to the fact that negative answers are not profitable for him he, in all possible cases,
moves his ball to the convenient adjacent vertex.
♥ ✛1 2
34
Figure 1: Bob’s ball moves into the place asked by Alice
So being in vertices 2 or 4 and getting from Alice the question ”Are you in the
vertex 1?” Bob quickly puts his ball in the asked vertex and honestly answers ”yes”.
However, if the Bob’s ball was initially in the vertex 3 he cannot escape the negative
answer notwithstanding to what vertex he moves his ball and he fails. One must pay
attention that in this case Alice not only gets the profit but also obtains the exact
information on the initial position of the ball: Bob’s honest answer immediately
reveals his initial position.
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2 . Equilibrium-it is when everybody is satisfied!
The interaction of our players can be described by a four on four matrix (hik) repre-
senting payoffs of Alice in each of the 16 possible game situations where a, b, c, d > 0
A\B 1 2 3 4
1 0 0 a 0
2 0 0 0 b
3 c 0 0 0
4 0 d 0 0
Table 1: The Payoff-matrix of Alice
are her payoffs in those situations when Bob cannot answer her questions affirma-
tively. Our game is an antagonistic game, so the payoff matrix of Bob is the opposite
to that of Alice: (−hik). The main problem of game theory is to find so-called points
of equilibrium or saddle points – game situations, optimal for all players at once. The
strategies forming the equilibrium situation are optimal in the sense that they provide
to each participant the maximum of what he/she can get independently of the acts of
the other partner. More or less rational behaviour is possible only if there are points
of equilibrium defined by the structure of the payoff matrix. A simple criterion for
the existence of the equilibrium points is known: the payoff matrix must have the
element maximal in its column and at the same time minimal in its row. It is easy to
see that our game does not have such equilibrium points. Non-existence of the saddle
point follows from the strict inequality valid for our game
max
j
min
k
hjk < min
k
max
j
hjk
So there are no stable strategies to follow for Bob and Alice in each separate turn
of the game. In spite of the absence of a rational choice at each turn of the game,
when the game is repeated many times some optimal lines of behaviour can be found.
To find them one must, following von Neumann [12], look for the so called mixed
generalisation of the game. In this generalised game the choice is made between
mixed strategies i.e. probability distributions of usual (they are called differently from
mixed ”pure” strategies) strategies. As the criterion for the choice of optimal mixed
strategies one takes the mathematical expectation value of the payoff which shows
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how much one can win on average by repeating the game many times. The optimal
mixed strategies for Alice and Bob are defined as such probability distributions on
the sets of pure strategies x0 = (x01, x
0
2, x
0
3, x
0
4) and y
0 = (y01, y
0
2, y
0
3, y
0
4) that for all
distributions of x, y the von Neumann-Nash inequalities are valid:
HA(x
0, y0) > HA(x, y
0) , HB(x
0, y0) > HB(x
0, y), (1)
where HA,HB – payoff functions of Alice and Bob are the expectation values of their
wins
HA(x, y) =
4∑
j,k=1
hjkxjyk , HB(x, y) = −
4∑
j,k=1
hjkxjyk
The combination of strategies, satisfying the von Neumann-Nash inequalities, is called
the situation of equilibrium in Nash’s sense. The equilibrium is convenient for each
player, deviation from it can only make the profit smaller. In equilibrium situations
the strategy of each player is optimal against the strategy of his (her) partner. Ex-
istence of equilibrium in mixed strategies is based on the main theorem of matrix
games theory (von Neumann’s theorem). To find them one must solve the pair of
dual problems of linear programming and it is made easily. The only question is: do
optimal strategies correctly describe the behaviour of Bob and Alice in their game
with a ball?
3 . The classical ”Foolish Alice”
In classical matrix game theory the optimal strategies of the players are totally defined
by their interests. All other characteristics of the participants of the game are totally
ignored. To go from this oversimplification of von Neumann’s game theory one must
look for other concepts of equilibrium, for example due to von Stackelberg [11] or
to study influence of the psychological relation on the outcomes of games [13]. Our
attention will be concentrated not on the psychological but on the logical aspect of
the conflict interaction of players. Before discussing the logical nuances pay attention
to the fact that the payoff matrix in table (1) does not give full information about
the rules of the game and interactions of the players.
To see this consider the totally different (from the point of view of the behaviour
of players the antagonistic) game ”The foolish Alice” with the same payoff matrix as
the game with a ball. Alice and Bob decide to meet at the corner of a big four-corner
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house but don’t agree on which corner. As usual Bob comes first. If Alice comes
to a corner from which she can see Bob she is satisfied, in the opposite case she,
thinking that he didn’t come, retires being insulted. The next day Bob, in order to
calm her, must give her some expensive present. Differently from the previous game
each participant of this game has passive position. If Bob does not see Alice he has no
reasons to go from one corner of the building to the other because he does not know
if she came or is just standing in the opposite corner. How to discriminate these two
identical (in the structure of the payoff) games?
1 2
34
Figure 2: Alice does not see Bob and is very dissatisfied
In order to see clearly the difference between the two games and to discriminate ”wise
Alice” from the ”foolish” one we introduce notations making the difference evident.
Encode the strategies of Alice and Bob by vectors, consisting of zeros and ones:
α = (α1, α2, α3, α4), β = (β1, β2, β3, β4)
so that the component equal to one means the applied pure strategy. Then it is
evident that
4∑
j=1
αj =
4∑
j=1
βj = 1, αj · αk = βj · βk = δjk
and the profit of Alice in one turn of any of the games considered is
HA(α, β) =
4∑
j,k=1
hjkαjβk (2)
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So, in the separate turn the ”wise” Alice is not different from the ”foolish” one. The
difference occurs in the behaviour when the game is repeated many times. The source
of the difference is in the different method of calculation of the average payoff.
Consider it explicitly. At first let us take the classical case of interaction. In the
case of the ”foolish” Alice the initial strategies of Bob are not correlated with the
strategies of his partner, so
E(αj · βk) = Eαj · Eβk
and averaging of the payoff gives the well known classical expression
EHA(α, β) =
4∑
j,k=1
hjkEαj · Eβk =
4∑
j,k=1
hjkxjyk = HA(x, y),
where xj , yk are frequencies of the corresponding pure strategies. For our payoff
matrix one obtains the expression of the payoff function for Alice as
HA(x, y) = ax1y3 + bx2y4 + cx3y1 + dx4y2 (3)
Then one must, using the linear programming, find the saddle points for natural
constrains
x1 + x2 + x3 + x4 = 1, y1 + y2 + y3 + y4 = 1, xj , yk > 0.
In our case there is only one equilibrium point and the mixed strategies of Alice
and Bob are found as:
x = (µa−1, µb−1, µc−1, µd−1), y = (µc−1, µd−1, µa−1, µb−1),
where µ = (a−1 + b−1 + c−1 + d−1)
−1
is the price or the value of the game i.e. the
average profit of Alice in the equilibrium situation. So the optimal frequency of Bob’s
being in this or that corner of the building is inversely proportional to the sum of
money which he must he give to his girl friend. The optimal strategy of Alice is more
sophisticated: she must not be very greedy and more frequently come to the places
where her friend will not pay too much to her.
Instead let us write the expression of the payoff function of the ”foolish” Alice in
a somehow different form, useful for our subsequent considerations. Consider random
events α13, α24 ⊂ SA, β13, β24 ⊂ SB, where SA, SB = {1, 2, 3, 4} – the sets of pure
strategies of Alice and Bob. Each of the considered events corresponds to the choice
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of the pair of opposite corners of the house. It is easy to see that events αjk∩βlm form
the SA × SB division of the space of the game situations and thus form a complete
set of events. Taking this into account one can write the payoff function for Alice as
the mixture of conditional expectation values.
HA(x, y) =
∑
jk,lm
Eαjk∩βlmHA · P (αjk ∩ βlm)
In the case of our payoff matrix this expression has the form
(ap113q
3
13 + cp
3
13q
1
13) · P (α13 ∩ β13) + (bp
2
24q
4
24 + dp
4
24q
2
24) · P (α24 ∩ β24), (4)
where pljk, q
l
jk – conditional probabilities of the choice of the corner l from the given
pair of opposite corners {j, k}. From this it follows that the conditional average payoff
for Alice will be
Eα13∩β13HA = ap
1
13q
3
13 + cp
3
13q
1
13 (5)
if both players choose the diagonal {1, 3} and
Eα24∩β24HA = bp
2
24q
4
24 + dp
4
24q
2
24 (6)
if they prefer the diagonal {2, 4}. If the players choose different diagonals of the house
the conditional payoff is equal to zero because in this case it is always possible for
Alice to see Bob and he must not pay for presents. Easy calculations show that
P (αjk ∩ βjk) = (xj + xk)(yj + yk), p
l
jk =
xl
xj + xk
, qljk =
yl
yj + yk
These formulas will be of use for us when we discuss the behaviour of Bob moving
the ball in the game ”Wise Alice”.
4 . Different logics – different behaviour
Let us discuss now the behaviour of players in the game ”Wise Alice”. First notice
that this game gives the simplest model of measurement (defining the place of the
object). Alice wants to know where is Bob located but she makes Bob active by her
questions, ”preparing” him in a definite ”state”. She gets exact information, not in
all cases, but only when the negative answer is obtained. Alice makes proposals but
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the logic of her propositions must be somehow different from the classical scheme.
More explicitly, let αk is the proposition of Alice that Bob’s ball is located on vertex
number k. One can consider this value as the predicate: the function defined on the
set SB of initial strategies of Bob taking logical values 0 or 1. For our box with a
ball Fig. 1 it is easy to see that the values of propositions of Alice are distributed as
follows:
α1(1) = α1(2) = α1(4) = 1, α1(3) = 0,
α2(2) = α2(1) = α2(3) = 1, α2(4) = 0, (7)
α3(3) = α3(2) = α3(4) = 1, α3(1) = 0,
α4(4) = α4(1) = α4(3) = 1, α4(2) = 0.
Defining disjunction as usual as
αj ∨ αk = max(αj, αk)
one obtains a ”slight” breaking of the classical logic: the disjunction of any pair of
different propositions occurs to be identically true:
αj ∨ αk = 1, j 6= k
Remember that for the classical ”foolish” Alice one has
α1 ∨ α2 ∨ α3 ∨ α4 = 1
Differences with classical logic occur also for negation. Instead of the classical rela-
tions ¬αj = 1− αj one has the equalities:
¬α1 = α3, ¬α3 = α1, ¬α2 = α4, ¬α4 = α2
Really, every time when Alice learns that the Bob’s ball is not located at the ques-
tioned vertex of the square she understands that it is located at the opposite vertice.
Notice that the law of double negation ¬(¬αj) = αj as well as the law of the excluded
third αj∨(¬αj) = 1 are valid. One must define the conjunction. It can be introduced
by the standard formula
αj ∧ αk = ¬((¬αj) ∨ (¬αk))
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It is easy to see that this is the only way of defining the conjunction if De Morgan’s
laws of duality are valid:
¬(αj ∧ αk) = (¬αj) ∨ (¬αk), ¬(αj ∨ αk) = (¬αj) ∧ (¬αk)
Defining thus all logical operations let us check other differences with classical Boolean
logic. First notice that in spite of the fact that any pair of different propositions of
Alice is in complementarity:
αj ∨ αk = 1,
αj ∧ αk = 0,
not all of them are orthocomplemented– mutually opposite. Only pairs of propositions
with the same ”parity” {α1;α3} {α2;α4} are orthocomplemented. Second, one has
a breaking of the distributivity law. So, for any triple of different j, k, l one has the
inequality
(αj ∨ αk) ∧ αl 6= (αj ∧ αl) ∨ (αk ∧ αl)
Really, the left side of the inequality is equal to αl,while the right side is zero. So the
logic of Alice occurs to be a non-distributive orthocomplemented lattice [14, 15]. Same
concerns the logic of Bob. His state reduced by the question of Alice is described by
the analogous system of predicates β1, β2, β3, β4 defined on the set of strategies of Alice
and taking the value 1 for those questions on which he can answer affirmatively. In
Fig. 3 a Hasse diagram is shown describing the nondistributive logic of our players. In
spite of the logical differences of introduced predicates α1, α2, α3, α4 and β1, β2, β3, β4
from the classical ones one can think that the payoff of Alice in the separate turn of
the game still is given by the same expression as before
HA(α, β) =
4∑
j,k=1
hjkαjβk
The main difficulties arise when one goes to the repeated game and when one tries
to calculate the average payoff. If one tries to give to the average value of predicates
the probabilistic interpretation:
Eαj = xj , Eβk = yk,
one immediately comes to the contradiction: the sum of probabilities of pair-wise
disjoint (due to our definition of the conjunction) outcomes is larger than unity
x1 + x2 + x3 + x4 = 3, y1 + y2 + y3 + y4 = 3.
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This follows from the additivity of the average and (8), leading to the following
identities
α1 + α2 + α3 + α4 = 3, β1 + β2 + β3 + β4 = 3
Hope for the validity of additivity for pairs of mutually neglecting events also occurs to
be in vain. Due to the property that the left-handed side of easily checked inequalities
α1 + ¬(α1) > I, α2 + ¬(α2) > I, α3 + ¬(α3) > I, α4 + ¬(α4) > I (8)
sometimes takes the value equal to 2, the main property of probability is broken even
for orthocomplemented elements. The probability properties are also broken for the
disjunction (see Hasse diagram Fig. 3).
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Figure 3: Lattice of Alice’s questions and Bob’s answers
If one considers all outcomes equally possible, then the probability of the always true
event, i.e. disjunction of any of two events occurs to be one half! So a classical proba-
bilistic description of the behaviour of the players in the repeated game is impossible
in principle. The solution for the situation arising is given by the ideas of quantum
mechanics.
5 . To averages through quantization
Following A.A.Grib and R.R.Zapatrin[1] we pay attention to the fact that the ortho-
lattice of the logic of interaction of partners of the ”Wise Alice” is isomorphic to the
ortholattice of invariant subspaces of the Hilbert space of the quantum system with
spin 1
2
and observables of the type of Sx Sθ. In Fig. 4 two pairs of mutually orthogo-
nal direct lines {a1; a3}, {a2; a4} are shown. One of these pairs makes diagonal the
operator Sx, the other Sθ. If one takes as representations of logical conjunction and
11
0 θ a1
a3
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
✁
a2
❍❍❍❍❍❍❍❍❍
❍❍
❍❍
❍❍
❍❍
❍
a4
Figure 4: Lattice of invariant subspaces of observables Sx and Sθ
disjunction their intersection and linear envelope and if negation corresponds to the
orthogonal complement one obtains the ortholattice isomorphic to the logic of our
players. One example of such an isomorphism is the mapping αj 7→ aj, j = 1, 2, 3, 4.
We saw that in one ”experiment” neither Alice nor Bob have a stable strategy. How-
ever if the game is repeated many times one can ask about optimal frequencies of
the corresponding pure strategies. Due to the non-distributivity of the logic ,as we
saw previously, it is impossible to define on the sets SA and SB of pure strategies a
probabilistic measure. The main problem is calculation of an adequate procedure of
averaging.
Following well known constructions of quantum mechanics we take instead of the
sets of pure strategies of Alice and Bob SA, SB the pair of two-dimensional Hilbert
spaces HA, HB. So pure strategies are represented by one-dimensional subspaces or
normalised vectors of Hilbert space (wave functions). Use of Hilbert space permits
us without any difficulties to realise the non-distributive logic of our players. For
this one must represent predicates α1, α2, α3, α4, β1, β2, β3, β4 describing questions of
Alice and locations of Bob’s ball by the corresponding self-conjugate operators. It is
important to notice that the ortholattice can be realised in an infinite set of ways.
Describe all these ways up to the unitary equivalence. We do this for the predicates
of Alice. The same can be done for Bob. In HA take an arbitrary one-dimensional
subspace and put its orth-projector into correspondence to the predicate α1: the
projector denote as α̂1. To the predicate α3 put into correspondence the orthogonal
complementary projector α̂3. Then the following evident and for us desirable relations
12
are valid:
α̂1 · α̂3 = α̂3 · α̂1 = O, α̂1 + α̂3 = I (9)
It is clear that the choice of these operators is unique up to unitary equivalence.
Take an arbitrary one-dimensional subspace different from the eigenspaces of the
projector α̂1 and put it into correspondence to the predicate of some orth-projector
α̂2. To the variable α4 put the projector 1− α̂2 . In the result one obtains one more
resolution of Hilbert space HA
α̂2 · α̂4 = α̂4 · α̂2 = O, α̂2 + α̂4 = I (10)
Projectors from different resolutions do not commute one with another. However there
is a simple connection between them: the second of direct resolutions is obtained from
the first by rotation through an angle different from multiples of 90o. In other words
there exists a unitary operator u such that
α̂2 = u
−1α̂1u, α̂4 = u
−1α̂3u (11)
It is clear that this unitary operator defines the class of unitary equivalent reali-
sations of our non-distributive ortholattice, negation is represented by going to the
complementary projector. Notice that differently from the predicative description
due to rules (7) leading to unpleasant inequalities (8) the operator representation of
the non-distributive lattice due to (9,10) is ”friendly” to orthocomplementarity:
α̂1 + (α̂1)
⊥ = I, α̂2 + (α̂2)
⊥ = I, α̂3 + (α̂3)
⊥ = I, α̂4 + (α̂4)
⊥ = I
Doing the same for the Bob’s lattice one comes to the observables β̂1, β̂2, β̂3, β̂4 and
analogous to u a unitary operator v giving the connections between ”even” and
”odd” variables. The next step of our scheme is the space of game situations. The
quantum analog of the classical space of game situations becomes the tensor prod-
uct HA⊗HB . This space is necessary for introducing the main observable: the payoff
for Alice. To write this observable following quantum mechanics take the classical
expression (3) of the payoff function of Alice
HA(α, β) =
4∑
j,k=1
hjkαjβk
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and write there the corresponding projectors. In the result one obtains the self-
conjugate operator in HA ⊗ HB, the observable of the payoff for Alice:
ĤA =
4∑
j,k=1
hjkα̂j ⊗ β̂k
Let Alice and Bob repeat their game with a ball many times and let us describe
theirbehaviour by normalised vectors ϕ ∈ HA, ψ ∈ HB. The element s = ϕ ⊗ ψ
expressing their interaction during the game is a normalised vector in HA ⊗ HB.
Taking it as the characteristic of the state of the game calculate the average in this
state Eϕ⊗ψĤA according to the standard rules of quantum mechanics
〈ĤAs, s〉 =
4∑
j,k=1
hjk〈(α̂j ⊗ β̂k) ϕ⊗ ψ, ϕ⊗ ψ〉
so that after easy transformations one gets for the average payoff for the given types
of behaviour of the players:
Eϕ⊗ψĤA =
4∑
j,k=1
hjk〈α̂jϕ, ϕ〉 · 〈β̂kψ, ψ〉
Putting into this formula the elements of our payoff matrix and using the notations
pj = 〈α̂jϕ, ϕ〉 , qk = 〈β̂kψ, ψ〉 one obtains
Eϕ⊗ψĤA = ap1q3 + cp3q1 + bp2q4 + dp4q2 (12)
It is useful to compare this expression with the classical average obtained earlier for
the ”foolish” Alice:
HA(x, y) = ax1y3 + cx3y1 + bx2y4 + dx4y2
There is some resemblance but there is also a serious difference. One could ask,
why it is impossible to recalculate the quantum average differently by normalising
the frequencies to one not only for each diagonal separately but for two diagonals
as it is made in the classical case? But the fact is that like in case of measuring
non-commuting operators of spin projections Alice knows about her interaction with
Bob when she asks him and receives the answer. This interaction is different when
questions on different diagonals are asked because different positions of the ball are
immovable for these cases. So relative to different interactions (different context)
different events are defined leading to different probabilistic spaces as it is true for
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measuring spin projections. One can use the metaphor that if in one case Alice is
throwing the coin and is interested if ”up” or ”down” will arise, in the other case the
interaction with Alice will change the coin in such a way as if a new coin is thrown,
on one side of which a big ”up” and the small ”down” of the previous coin are drawn.
On the other side of the new coin the opposite situation occurs. So the new coin
is made asymmetric following the structure of the payoff matrix. In homogeneity of
events in the quantum case makes impossible the renormalisation of frequencies and
leads to new results for averages.
6 . Probability amplitudes instead of probabilities
The main difference in the given formulas is in the sense of variables. If xj , xk are
probabilities, the pj , pk cannot be because they contradict the main laws of the
probability theory. Really, taking into account that the projectors α̂j and β̂k with
indices of the same parity commute and form a resolution of unity, one obtains after
standard calculations the following identities.
p1 + p3 = 〈α̂1ϕ, ϕ〉+ 〈α̂3ϕ, ϕ〉 = 〈(α̂1 + α̂3)ϕ, ϕ〉 = 1, (13)
p2 + p4 = 1, q1 + q3 = 1, q2 + q4 = 1 (14)
So, differently from classical probability theory, for each family of pairwise disjoint
events {α̂j}, {β̂k} one obtains the relations
p1 + p2 + p3 + p4 = 2, q1 + q2 + q3 + q4 = 2
The sense of the values pj , pk is obtained by using the standard quantum rule. Let
for example the behaviour of Alice be described by the normalized vector ϕ ∈ HA,
and let ξ+1 , ξ
−
1 ∈ HA be normalised eigenvectors of the projector with eigenvalues 1
(”yes”) and 0 (”no”). Projecting the state vector of Alice onto the basis {ξ+1 , ξ
−
1 }
ϕ = c+ξ
+
1 + c−ξ
−
1
one obtains that she can find Bob’s ball on the first vertex of the square with the
probability
p1 = 〈α̂1(c+ξ
+
1 + c−ξ
−
1 ), c+ξ
+
1 + c−ξ
−
1 〉 = 〈c+a
+
1 , c+ξ
+
1 + c−ξ
−
1 〉 = |c+|
2
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and on the opposite vertex with the probability p3 = |c−|
2. So the numbers pj, pk
must be interpreted due to quantum mechanics as the squares of moduli of probability
amplitudes. The identities obtained by us earlier for the classical game make it pos-
sible to compare each of the four pairs of numbers {p1, p3}, {p2, p4}, {q1, q3}, {q2, q4}
separately with the corresponding conditional probabilities. Compare formula(12)for
the quantum average
Eϕ⊗ψĤA = (ap1q3 + cp3q1) + (bp2q4 + dp4q2)
with formula (4) used for calculation of the classical average by the use of conditional
probabilities and conditional expectation values:
EHA = (ap
1
13q
3
13 + cp
3
13q
1
13) · P13 + (bp
2
24q
4
24 + dp
4
24q
2
24) · P24 (15)
In the case when the corresponding pairs of the squares of moduli of amplitudes are
equal to classical conditional probabilities
p1 = p
1
13, p3 = p
3
13, p2 = p
2
24, p4 = p
4
24
q1 = q
1
13, q3 = q
3
13, q2 = q
2
24, q4 = q
4
24
one obtains an interesting result: the ”wise” Alice gets a larger payoff than that which
is obtained by her ”foolish” copy:
Eϕ⊗ψĤA > EHA
Notice, however, that to have this one must have the situation where the squares
of moduli of the probability amplitudes in ”quantum” Nash equilibrium are equal
to the conditional probabilities obtained by applying the apparatus of the classical
game theory. However there is no foundation for such an equality. In fact, if the
equilibrium point of the classical game is searched on the set of nonnegative numbers
with constrains
x1 + x2 + x3 + x4 = 1, y1 + y2 + y3 + y4 = 1
then in the quantum game case for the squares of moduli of the probability amplitudes
besides the explicit linear relations
p1 + p3 = 1, p2 + p4 = 1, q1 + q3 = 1, q2 + q4 = 1
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there are implicit relations due to unitary dependence (12) of projection operators
with even and odd indices. The difference between the two pictures is due to the
fact that in the quantum situation the formula of full probability (15) is broken: the
average payoff to Alice is equal to the sum of conditional probabilities and not to
their mixture: P13 = P24 = 1. This again demonstrates that it is impossible to find
a quantum equilibrium point by use of only formula (13) of the average payoff as a
function of eight variables {pj, qk} with the relations written before between them.
The equilibrium is defined not by the combination of the squares of moduli of the
amplitudes of Alice and Bob but by the combination of wave functions ϕ ∈ HA and
ψ ∈ HB.
7 . Behaviour of the player as realisation of logic
Besides the amplitudes, characterising the behaviour of players, our model has two
additional structural characteristics: unitary rotations u and v , giving an operator
representation of the ortholattices of Alice and Bob up to unitary equivalence. Each of
these operators can be characterised by the angle between eigensubspaces of even and
odd order. Denote by θA the angle between direct lines corresponding to the largest
eigenvectors of operators α̂1 , α̂2 of Alice and θB the analogous angle characterising
the realisation of the logic of Bob. Differently from the amplitudes characterising
the behaviour of the players, being the variables of the model, the angles are its
parameters.These parameters characterise the type of player, making it possible to
consider logic as some factor forming the behaviour. Some sense of these values
can be the following: the angles characterise the connections between choices of the
diagonals of the square or some preferences for this or that adjacent vertex. The
angles θA, θB define commutation relations for corresponding operators. Consider
for example the operators α̂1, α̂2. Taking as an orthonormal basis in the space
HA of Alice the eigenbasis of the operator α̂1 let us write the matrices of this pair of
operators
α̂1 =
(
1 0
0 0
)
, α̂2 =
(
cos2 θA sin θA cos θA
sin θA cos θA sin
2θA
)
where θA is the angle on which eigenbasis of the operator α̂2 is rotated relative to
the eigenbasis of the operator α̂1. Calculating the commutator of these matrices one
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obtains:
[α̂1, α̂2] =
i
2
· sin 2θA
(
0 − i
i 0
)
Analogous commutation relations are obtained for Bob’s operators. Non-commutativity
of the operators of the logic representation expresses evident, without any mathemat-
ics, the dependence of the results of the game on the order of acts. So Bob’s state
is different depending on the order: ”1”, then ”2” or ”2”, then ”1”, in which he
received Alice’s questions . So in the quantum model one takes into account not only
the interests of the players represented in the payoff matrix but in some sense their
personal features on which depends the level of realisation of interests.
8 . In search of the quantum equilibrium.
The definition of the Nash equilibrium for the quantum case is not much different
from the classical case (1) and can be written as
EĤA(ϕ
0, ψ0) > EĤA(ϕ, ψ
0), EĤB(ϕ
0, ψ0) > EĤB(ϕ
0, ψ)
It is convenient to find the equilibrium points in the coordinate form. To do this let us
fix in the space of strategies of Alice HA eigenbases {ξ
+
1 , ξ
−
1 } {ξ
+
2 , ξ
−
2 } correspond-
ing to two projectors α̂1, α̂2 and let us do the same for Bob, taking bases {η
+
1 , η
−
1 }
{η+2 , η
−
2 }. The angles between the largest eigenvectors denote as θA and θB . Then
one can write in the quantum payoff function
EĤA(ϕ, ψ) = ap1q3 + cp3q1 + bp2q4 + dp4q2
the squares of moduli of the amplitudes pj, pk as
p1 = cos
2 α, p3 = sin
2 α, p2 = cos
2(α− θA), p4 = sin
2(α− θA),
q1 = cos
2 β, q3 = sin
2 β, q2 = cos
2(β − θB), q4 = sin
2(β − θB),
where α, β are the angles of vectors ϕ, ψ to the corresponding axises. For values of
angles one can take the interval [00; 1800]. In the result the problem of search of the
equilibrium points of the quantum game became the problem of finding a minimax
of the function of two angle variables
F (α, β) = a cos2 α sin2 β + c sin2 α cos2 β+
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+b cos2(α− θA) sin
2(β − θB) + d sin
2(α− θA) cos
2(β − θB)
on the square [00; 1800] × [00; 1800]. In other words our quantum game occurred to
be an infinite antagonistic game of two persons on the square. Solving such games
in pure strategies, i.e. search for saddle points of the function F (α, β) is a difficult
problem. It is known [16] that for the existence of the saddle points properties of
continuity and smoothness of the payoff function are not enough. Present theorems
of existence use properties of convexity of this function. However in our case we don’t
have these properties. One can find examples of some values of the elements a, b, c, d
of the payoff matrix (9) when the function F (α, β) doesn’t have saddle points. Not
much better is the situation with methods of search of the saddle points. Differently
from the geometrical saddle points the conditions of the Nash equilibrium are not just
putting to zero values of the corresponding partial derivatives. So in the situation of
absence of simple analytical solutions one must look for numerical methods. To do
calculations we use an algorithm based on the construction of ”curves of reaction” or
”curves of the best answers” of the participants of the game.
The definition of curves of reaction is based on the following consideration. If Alice
knew what decision Bob will take she could make an optimal choice. But the essence
of the game situation is that she doesn’t know it. She must take into account his
different strategies and on each possible act of the partner she must find the optimal
way to act. Her considerations look like considerations of the player, expressed by
the formula: ”if he does this, then I shall do that”. Bob thinks the same way. So one
must consider two functions α = RA(β) and β = RB(α) the plots of which are called
the curves of reactions of Alice and Bob. Due to the definition of these functions
max
α
F (α, β) = F (RA(β), β), min
β
F (α, β) = F (α, RB(α))
It is easy to see that intersections of curves of reaction give points of Nash equilib-
rium. Numerical experiments show that dependent on the values of the parameters
a, b, c, d of the payoff function and the angles characterising the type of player one
has qualitatively different pictures. Intersections can be absent, there can be one in-
tersection and lastly there can be the case with two equilibrium points with different
values of the payoff of the game, which is absent in the case of the classical matrix
game.
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9 . Examples
1. Two equilibrium points arise in the case of the payoff matrix:
A\B 1 2 3 4
1 0 0 3 0
2 0 0 0 3
3 5 0 0 0
4 0 1 0 0
and an operator representation of the ortholattice corresponding to angles θA = 10
0,
θB = 70
0. One of the equilibrium points is inside the square, the other one is on it’s
boundary (see Fig. 5).
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90
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60
120
150
Strategies of Bob
Strategies of Alice
Figure 5: Two points of Nash equilibrium
The curves of reaction in this case happen to be discontinuous. For convenience the
discontinuities are shown by thin lines. The discontinuous character of the curve of
reaction of Alice made it impossible for one more equilibrium point to occur. One of
the equilibrium takes place for α = 145, 50, β = 149, 50 and gives the following values
for the squares of moduli of amplitudes:
for Alice p1 = 0, 679; p2 = 0, 509; p3 = 0, 321; p4 = 0, 491;
for Bob q1 = 0, 258; q2 = 0, 967; q3 = 0, 742; q4 = 0, 033.
The price of the quantum game, i.e. the equilibrium value of the profit for Alice
in this case is equal to EĤA = 2.452. The second equilibrium point corresponds to
angles α = 1800, β = 123, 50 and the squares of the amplitude moduli
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for Alice p1 = 1.000; p2 = 0, 967; p3 = 0.000; p4 = 0.033;
for Bob q1 = 0, 695; q2 = 0.646; q3 = 0.305; q4 = 0.354.
The price of the game in the second equilibrium point is equal to EĤA = 1.926. For
the classical game with the same payoff matrix (see section 4) the price of the game
happens to be smaller and is equal to 15
28
= 0.536. Differently from the quantum game
the classical game has onlyone equilibrium point which is obtained for the following
frequencies
for Alice x1 =
5
28
; x2 =
5
28
; x3 =
3
28
; x4 =
15
28
;
for Bob y1 =
3
28
; y2 =
15
28
; y3 =
5
28
; y4 =
5
28
.
To compare the quantum game with the classical one the conditional probabilities for
the choice of vertices of the square after the choice of the diagonal are found to be:
for Alice: p113 =
5
8
; p313 =
3
8
; p224 =
1
4
; p424 =
3
4
;
for Bob : q113 =
3
8
; q313 =
5
8
; q224 =
3
4
; q424 =
1
4
;
and the conditional average payoffs (5,6) for each diagonal are:
E13HA = 1.875; E24HA = 0.75.
The price of the classical game is obtained by multiplication of these expressions on
the probabilities of the corresponding conditions given in section(4). Terms of the
quantum payoff, associated with these conditional averages Eϕ⊗ψĤA in case of the
first equilibrium point are
ap1q3 + cp3q1 = 1.927 ; bp2q4 + dp4q2 = 0.525
For the second equilibrium point one has:
ap1q3 + cp3q1 = 0.915 ; bp2q4 + dp4q2 = 1.048.
2. A unique equilibrium is observed for example in the case when all nonzero
payoffs are equal and are equal to one and for equal angles θA = 45
0, θB = 45
0. The
equilibrium point is located in the upper right vertex of the square (see Fig. 6):
The curve of Bob’s reaction is shown on the Fig. 6 as continuous while the analogous
curve of Alice is discontinuous when Bob is using the strategy corresponding to the
angle β = 900. To make it more explicit the discontinuity is shown by drawing the
thin line. In reality both lines are discontinuous. This becomes evident if one prolongs
both functions on the whole real axis taking into account the periodicity: the plots
of one of them is obtained by the shift of the other one on the halfperiod-900. The
squares of the amplitude moduli in this case have the following values
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Figure 6: The unique Nash equilibrium
for Alice: p1 = 1 ; p2 = 0.5 ; p3 = 0 ; p4 = 0.5 ;
for Bob: q1 = 1 ; q2 = 0.5 ; q3 = 0 ; q4 = 0.5 .
The payoff of the ”wise” Alice in this case is EĤA = 0.5 while her classical copy
gets only 0.125. Differently from the quantum case for the classical players with such
a payoff function all vertices of the square are equally probable.
The unique equilibrium located inside the square takes place for the initial payoff
matrix a = 3, b = 3, c = 5, d = 1 and angles θA = 15
0, θB = 35
0 (see Fig. 7).
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Figure 7: The other example of the unique Nash equilibrium
3. Absence of equilibrium is perhaps one of the most interesting phenomena,
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because as it is known for classical matrix games, equilibrium in mixed strategies
always exist. One can obtain absence of equilibrium by taking the same payoff matrix
for which one as well as two points of equilibrium were found. For this it is sufficient
to take the operator representation of the ortholattice with typical angles: θA = 30
0,
θB = 20
0 (see Fig. 8).
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Figure 8: Absence of Nash equilibrium
Absence of equilibrium in this case as it is seen from the Fig. 8 is due to the
discontinuity of the functions of reaction which is impossible in the classical case. We
met this phenomenon in the first example when two equilibrium points were obtained.
This last example shows the importance of the realisation of a non-distributive lattice.
In the language of the game theory one can understand it as follows: having the same
interests the players can form their behaviour qualitatively in different ways. So the
mathematician can give to the client, for example to Alice, strategic recommendations:
how she can organise the style of her behaviour to make the profit larger for the same
payoff conditions. For this, however, he must know the choice of the representation
of Bob’s logic.
Concluding remarks
The construction and analysis of our models show that the main difference between
classical and quantum points of view on observable phenomena is expressed in the
way of calculation of averages. In fact, if one remembers the first work of M.Planck on
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the spectra of radiation of a perfect black body one will see that the correct formula
was obtained on the basis of a postulate, leading to the other than classical way of
calculating oscillator average energy. Instead of the uniform distribution for degrees
of freedom one used an averaging based on totally different statistics. The subse-
quent history of quantum physics is in some sense the history of the development of
the concept of the average: important characteristics of the objects of the microworld
are manifested in their ”statistics”. The development of the mathematical formalism
of quantum mechanics is also strongly based on the same idea. Positive function-
als on non-commutative algebras with involution in GNS construction are nothing
but averages. The difference between the quantum and classical concepts of average
consists in the fact that there are questions in quantum mechanics that cannot have
simultaneous answers, i.e. the ortholattice of answers is not a Boolean algebra, the
distributivity rule is broken in it. Practically all modern theories of quantum me-
chanics more or less explicitly suppose that the corresponding lattice is the lattice of
closed subspaces of Hilbert space. This supposition has a constructive character and
leads to operator representations and it is just this scheme of calculating the averages
that was realised in this work. In what sense and what is the justification of using
the apparatus of quantum mechanics in game theory when one deals with properties
of macroscopic objects? The woman taking in her hand the diamond and feeling
its anomalous heat capacity can know nothing about the formula of Einstein-Debye
and about the specific procedure of averaging, explaining the observed phenomenon.
However, one who knows it will not be surprised by the attempts to explain some fea-
tures of macrophenomena by the specific way of calculating the averages. The exact
answer to our question implies an analysis of the logical structure of the investigated
phenomena. If the logic adequately representing the experience is non-distributive
then classical procedures of calculating the averages lead, as we saw, to contradictions
and one must use another apparatus. If the obtained lattice happens to be the lat-
tice of subspaces, then the answer is given by the Gleason’s theorem [17] saying that
probability measures on the lattice of projectors have strictly definite form. So if one
is solving the problem of averaging of the payoff function, taking into account logical
conditions of the players, then going to quantization in some cases is predestined.
One can only be surprised that the structure of the classical expression of the
payoff function is such as if it were specially invented to put there instead of the
two-valued function the operators. This leads to the general scheme of quantization
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of games. In any case if one considers not antagonistic but bimatrix game when the
interests of the players are not strictly antagonistic, the scheme of quantization will
be the same. This problem however as well as games of many persons goes beyond
the contents of this paper. The problem of non-uniqueness of orthocomplements in
the lattices is also goes beyond our paper.It exists even in case of our lattice: for
negations one can take correspondence between ”even” and ”odd” questions. In the
general case this problem, touching the theory of representations of internal symme-
tries of non-classical logics can lead also to some natural application of the formalism
of quantum mechanics. The important point in our scheme is taking care in the dif-
ference between the logic and its operator representation. One sees that there exists a
continuum of classes of unitary equivalent representations, parameterised by the an-
gles of the type θA, θB. Each of these representations can be described by the commu-
tation relations for the corresponding non-commuting operators. In the players logic
these pairs of projectors correspond to mutually complementary questions, neither of
which is the negation of the other. As it was shown previously non-commutativity is
connected with the dynamics of the game – the order in which questions are posited.
Considering the quantum game we had the problem of existence of equilibrium. As
was seen from the examples their existence or absence is connected not only with
the structure of the payoff matrix but also with the representation of the lattice of
properties. Absence of equilibrium is also connected with the representation of the
behaviour of the players by pure states-by vectors in Hilbert spaces, when the game
situation is represented by some resolved element of their tensor product. The notion
of equilibrium can be enlarged as it is done in the classical game theory taking mixed
enlargement on the basis of the density matrices. Here we didn’t consider entangled
states. As was shown [2] in the case of entangled states one must deal with more
complex non-distributive lattices. The search of equilibrium among entangled non-
factorisable states can lead to success in proving the existence of equilibrium in the
general case of quantum games.
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